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Non-Technical Summary
On January 25, 2001 the finance minister of Germany, Hans Eichel, announced
a “radical shake-up of the German financial supervision” (Engelen, 2001). He
declared the establishment of an integrated financial supervisory authority. 15
month later, on May 1, 2002 the Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht
(BaFin) started operating. Germany thereby followed the general trend towards
integrated financial supervision.
The main reason for the creation of single financial services supervisors is the
growing integration of financial sectors leading to the blurring of boundaries
between banking, insurance and securities activities. One aspect in this context
is the growing importance of financial conglomerates, the acquisition of
Dresdner Bank by Allianz being a paramount example. Another aspect is that
channels of distribution of financial products are no longer as specialised as they
used to be. Banks use their branch network to sell, e.g., insurance products or
even non-financial products. Moreover, one can observe a blurring of
boundaries between financial products. These financial market developments are
often labelled with the notions bancassurance and Allfinanz.
The aim of this paper is to analyse the development of Allfinanz, and hence the
driving forces for the creation of the single supervisory authority in Germany.
Moreover, BaFin’s tasks and structure are discussed, as well as the involvement
of the German Bundesbank in financial supervision.
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21 Introduction
On January 25, 2001 the finance minister of Germany, Hans Eichel, announced
a “radical shake-up of the German financial supervision” (Engelen, 2001). He
declared the establishment of an integrated financial supervisory authority. 15
month later, on May 1, 2002 the Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht
(BaFin) started operating. BaFin consolidated the hitherto separated supervisory
agencies for banking (Bundesaufsichtsamt für das Kreditwesen - BAKred),
insurance (Bundesaufsichtsamt für das Versicherungswesen - BAV) and
securities (Bundesaufsichtsamt für den Wertpapierhandel - BAWe). Germany
thereby followed the general trend towards integrated financial supervision.
One reason for the creation of single financial services supervisors is the
growing integration of the financial sector. The distinctions between banking,
insurance and securities markets become increasingly blurred. One aspect in this
context is the growing importance of financial conglomerates, the acquisition of
Dresdner Bank by Allianz being a paramount example. Another aspect is that
channels of distribution of financial products are no longer as specialised as they
used to be. Banks use their branch network to sell, e.g., insurance products or
even non-financial products. Moreover, one can observe a blurring of
boundaries between financial products. These financial market developments are
often labelled with the notions bancassurance and Allfinanz.
The aim of this paper is to discuss the development of Allfinanz and the creation
of the integrated financial regulator1 in Germany. The next section gives the
rationale for the reform of financial supervision in Germany. Section 3 describes
the importance of Allfinanz for the German financial sector and evaluates the
resulting need for integrating supervisory functions. Section 4 deals with the
formation, organisation and tasks of the new integrated supervisor BaFin. The
involvement in financial supervision of the German central bank, the
Bundesbank, is discussed in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 The Rationale for Integrated Supervision in Germany
The arguments in favour of unification of supervisory functions are numerous.2
Well-established arguments include the following: Unification allows the
realisation of cost savings through economies of scale; the supervisory structure
                                          
1 Note that throughout the paper the notions supervisor and regulator are used interchangeable
as is common practise in the literature.
2 For a full discussion of the arguments for as well as against integrated supervision, see
Briault (1999, 2002), Abrams and Taylor (2000, 2002), and Luna Martínez and Rose
(2003).
3should reflect the integration of financial sectors; regulatory arbitrage can be
avoided; accountability is enhanced; and international co-operation is fostered.
Although “there is a strong consensus on the benefits of integrated supervision”
(Taylor and Fleming, 1999b: 43), there are also strong arguments against the
creation of an integrated supervisor. These include the following concerns:
Unification could lead to lack of clarity; an integrated agency could suffer from
diseconomies of scale; concentration of power could vitiate democratic policies;
and moral hazard concerns could be extended across the whole financial sector.
The aim of this paper is not to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of
establishing a single financial regulator. Instead we focus on the specific
German situation and the motivation to create a single supervisory agency there.
The German Situation
In Germany the decisive factors that led to the creation of the integrated
supervisory authority are the following:3
The integration of financial sectors leads to the blurring of borders between
banking, insurance and securities. Customers increasingly demand
comprehensive financial services. Providers have adjusted to these necessities
by developing Allfinanz-strategies and Allfinanz-products. Thus, banks,
insurance companies and securities firms are increasingly competing for the
same clients with similar or often identical products.
Convergence of products of banking, insurance and securities firms is
particularly advanced with respect to mortgage credits, and asset management.
The blurring of borders between financial products is further pushed ahead by
the reform of pension systems. In Germany – as in many other European
countries – the traditional pay-as-you-go pension systems are increasingly
replaced by occupational and private pension plans. In this context banks,
insurance firms and other financial services providers are more and more
offering a variety of cross-sectoral products (e.g., fund-based life insurance).
There is also convergence with respect to the distribution of products. Insurers
make use of the distribution channels of banks and vice versa. Moreover, the
new information and communication technologies, such as the internet, make it
easy to dismantle the traditional value-added chain of financial services. A
                                          
3 See, e.g., Bundesministerium der Finanzen (2001), Börsen-Zeitung (2001a), BaFin (2004).
4mortgage credit contract, for example, doesn’t have to be placed over the bank
counter.
The co-operation of financial institutions has also lead to the formation of
financial conglomerates, i.e. groups of companies with a common strategy and a
central management structure, offering a wide spectrum of one-stop financial
products.4 Although a major financial conglomerate hadn’t emerged by the time
Finance Minister Eichel announced the plans to integrate supervision, this
changed rapidly in Mai 2001 with the merger of the biggest German insurance
company Allianz and Dresdner Bank – the third-biggest bank in Germany at that
time.
In addition to these arguments based on the increasing importance of Allfinanz,
an often cited advantage of the new arrangements for financial supervision is
that it will boost the competitiveness of Germany as a financial centre, since
efficient and effective financial supervision can be regarded as a location factor
(vision+money, 2002). For all market participants it will be easier to deal with a
single regulator instead of three separate agencies. Moreover, co-operation with
supervisory bodies abroad is simplified, and the “voice of the German federal
regulator will carry more weight in international negotiations over financial
regulations” (BaFin, 2003).
Finally, there are the well-known arguments of economies of scale and scope,
and preventing regulatory arbitrage.
With respect to the development towards establishing a European framework for
financial supervision, Finance Minister Eichel emphasised that the creation of
the single German financial supervisor doesn’t block any EU-wide supervisory
concept (Bundesministerium der Finanzen, 2001). Eichel argued that the new
integrated structure may even be seen as a promoter for a European supervisory
system.
3 Allfinanz in the German Financial Market
As was outlined in the previous section, the main rationale for the creation of the
integrated financial supervisory authority in Germany was – as in most other
countries – the blurring of borders between banks, insurers and financial
services providers. The increasing importance of Allfinanz requires unification
of supervisory functions. This section looks at the importance of Allfinanz in the
                                          
4 We will differentiate the notions financial conglomerate, Allfinanz, and Bancassurance in
the next section.
5German financial market. Beforehand, we define and differentiate the notions
Allfinanz, bancassurance and financial conglomerates.
Allfinanz, Bancassurance, and Financial Conglomerates
In this paper we define Allfinanz as a more general notion that includes any
development towards offering one-stop financial services (Börner, 2000). In
Germany Allfinanz is usually understood as offering a wide range of financial
products comprising banking and insurance products. Allfinanz concepts may
take different forms, such as distribution agreements, joint ventures, cross-
shareholding, mergers and acquisitions, and internal development.
Because most references of convergence at the distribution level have been to
bank-insurance linkages, the French term bancassurance is often used. In the
original sense it refers merely to the distribution of insurance products via the
bank channel (Lumpkin, 2002: 7; Benoist, 2002). It is, however, often used in a
more broader sense for the involvement of banks, in the manufacturing,
marketing or distribution of insurance products (Wolgast, 2002). In contrast, the
term assurfinance refers to a similar situation in which an insurance company
sells savings products (Lumpkin, 2002; Benoist, 2002).
Allfinanz and bancassurance are thus rather general concepts describing
financial convergence, i.e. various kinds of interfaces (with or without capital
ties) between different categories of financial services providers – usually
between banks and insurers.
The label financial conglomerate is used for corporate groups with a common
strategy and a central management structure, offering a wide spectrum of one-
stop financial products (Bundesministerium der Finanzen, 2001). Some authors
use the notion for groups of companies that provide significant services in at
least two different financial sectors (Abrams and Taylor, 2002; Group of Ten,
2001). Others in contrast use it for groups that combine banking, securities, and
insurance activities within one organisation (Lelyveld and Schilder, 2002;
Lumpkin, 2002). In the light of the universal bank structure which characterises
Germany as well as many other continental European countries, the latter
definition seems to be more appropriate.
In Germany, banks have traditionally been free to operate as universal banks,
i.e. to undertake a full range of securities activities. Thus, most (at least bigger)
banks typically combine commercial banking and investment banking activities.
Consequently, one could think of German (and most continental European)
banks as financial conglomerates when using the notion for groups that provide
significant services in at least two financial sectors. In the context of integrated
6financial supervision it is therefore reasonable to consider groups as financial
conglomerates that combine universal banking and insurance activities.
The primary motive for financial consolidation is the realisation of economies of
scale and scope with respect to, e.g., the distribution and marketing of products,
back office activities or asset management.5 This allows for costs savings and
revenue enhancements. Cross-selling of products becomes possible, and the
offering of combinations of bank and insurance products, e.g., in the context of
the current pension reform.
The Importance of Allfinanz in the German Financial Sector
As mentioned above, a major financial conglomerate hadn’t emerged in
Germany before the acquisition of Dresdner Bank by Allianz in Mai 2001.
However, Germany had a tradition of cross-shareholding between banks and
insurance companies. For example, Munich Re, the world’s biggest reinsurance
firm and Germany’s second-biggest primary insurer owns about one-quarter of
HypoVereinsbank, Germany’s second biggest bank. Thus, collaboration
between banks and insurance companies has always been quite important,
although in Germany besides Allianz/Dresdner no major financial conglomerate
has emerged.
                                          
5 For the advantages as well as the disadvantages of forming a financial conglomerate, see,
e.g., Wolgast (2001, 2002), EU Commission (2001), Brixner (2002), Börner (2000),
Benoist (2002).
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Figure 1 shows cross-sector mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in the German
financial sector over the years 1990-99. After having increased between 1990
and 1995, the number of deals has fallen until 1998. However, total transaction
volume has sharply increased in 1998 and again in 1999.
8Figure 2: Total Transaction Volume of Cross-Sector M&As in the Financial
Industry as Percent of GDP
0.00%
0.10%
0.20%
0.30%
0.40%
0.50%
0.60%
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
All Countries
Europe
Germany
Source: Group of Ten (2001); Note: Included are all mergers or acquisitions of majority
interest, i.e. the acquirer’s ownership share of the target exceeded 50% as a result of the
transaction. Deals classified by sector and country of the target firm.
Figure 2 compares total transaction volumes of cross-sector M&As in Germany
with all European and all other countries.6 Cross-sector M&A volume in
Germany as a percent of GDP has been relatively low compared to other
countries until 1998. Only the figure for 1999 reaches the size of the other
countries.
                                          
6 Included in the sample are the United States, Canada, Japan, Australia, Belgium, France,
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
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However, when looking at shares of cross-sector M&A deals as a percentage of
total M&A deals in the financial industry, Germany lies mostly above the other
countries (Figure 3).
Figure 4 shows data for the market shares that financial conglomerates have in
the national banking and insurance markets, respectively. In Germany financial
conglomerates have relatively little stakes in the financial markets as compared
with other European countries. In banking 17% of bank deposits can be assigned
to financial conglomerates, which compares to a 27% for the total EU. As
compared to banking, financial conglomerates have more stakes in the German
insurance markets: 30% of total life insurance premium income and 29% of total
non-life insurance premium income can be assigned to conglomerates. This is
above the numbers for the total EU, where conglomerates are responsible for
27% of life and 19% of non-life premium income. Thus, financial
conglomerates in Germany are of lower importance than in other European
countries, in particular Belgium and Finland. However, the market share of
financial conglomerates in the German financial markets is quite significant,
particularly in insurance.
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Figure 4: Market Shares of Financial Conglomerates in the National
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As mentioned above, financial consolidation is just one aspect of Allfinanz.
Convergence with respect to the distribution of financial products is another
important aspect.
Figure 5 shows shares of distribution channels of insurance as measured by total
volume of new business. The most important distribution channel is the one via
single tied agents which accounts for about 60 percent of the new insurance
business in 2000 and 2001. Multiple intermediaries account for about 20 percent
of new business. Distribution via the bank counter is still of minor importance:
only 9.6 percent in 2000, and an even smaller 8.9 percent in 2001, were
distributed via banks.
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Figure 5: Shares of Distribution Channels of Insurance in Germany as
Measured by the Volume of Total New Business (in Percent)
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Overall, one could conclude from the presented data that Allfinanz is still not
very important for the German financial market, and that therefore the creation
of an integrated supervisory authority may not have been necessary from this
perspective. However, there are many other important aspects of Allfinanz that
are difficult to capture. The blurring of boundaries with respect to products
being just one example. In the course of the pension reform new hybrid products
gain increasingly importance. Another example is the rapid development of
credit derivatives that are used by banks and other institutions to limit risk
concentrations in their portfolios. Clearly, such products are a useful
contribution to the efficient redistribution of risk. Many of the risks are on-sold
by banks and find their way into the portfolio of insurance companies (Crockett,
2001). Thereby banks and insurance companies are closely connected through
risk exposure without any formal co-operation.
Thus, at the end of the day Allfinanz might play quite a significant role in the
German financial market – even today, and it clearly is gaining in importance.
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4 BaFin – The New Single Supervisor
Formation of the Single Supervisory Authority
A reform of the supervision of the German financial markets was announced on
January 25, 2001 by Hans Eichel, the German finance minister. He proposed the
creation of a new Federal Authority for Financial Services Supervision with the
responsibility for the supervision of credit institutions, insurance companies,
investment firms and other financial institutions. The plan of consolidating
financial market supervision was accompanied by a proposal to restructure the
German Bundesbank. By proposing a central management structure Eichel
wanted to secure a more efficient representation of the Bundesbank in the
decision-making process of the European Central Bank (ECB). Eichel’s
proposal was followed by a heated public debate. At first, it was fiercely
opposed by the federal states (Länder), the Bundesbank and also the ECB (FAZ,
2001).
Ever since the introduction of the euro – when the national central banks lost
their monetary policy function – the federal government and the federal states
argued about the structure of the Bundesbank. So even before the plan of
consolidating supervision was announced, the Bundesbank’s leadership had
been carrying out a public campaign to become the sole banking supervisor by
integrating the banking supervisory agency, BAKred, into a department of the
Bundesbank (Engelen, 2001). By such a move the Bundesbank would have been
compensated for the loss of responsibility for monetary policy. The Bundesbank
had been already heavily involved in banking supervision through the support
service it had provided to the BAKred. They argued that without strengthening
the role of the Bundesbank as a banking supervisor, it would lose influence in
the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) as many other central banks in
Euroland are responsible for banking supervision. Therefore, in fear of further
losing competencies the Bundesbank fiercely opposed Eichel’s plan to merge
the separated supervisors into a single agency.
In the end, however, the Bundesbank, lacking broad support from the Länder,
couldn’t achieve its plans to become the sole banking supervisor and supported
Eichel’s plans. This move was also based on the fact that Eichel ceded ground
and guaranteed the Bundesbank and the regional branches of the Bundesbank
(Landeszentralbanken) an ongoing strong role in banking supervision (Börsen-
Zeitung, 2001b). Thereby Eichel responded also to a statement by the ECB7 that
warned against taking away prudential supervision from the central bank. The
Länder finally also supported Eichel’s plans – which in the light of their
                                          
7 ECB (2001).
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influence on legislation through the Bundesrat (the upper house of the German
parliament) was of crucial importance.8
On March 22, 2002 the bill on restructuring financial supervision was ultimately
passed and on May 1, 2002 the new single regulator, Bundesanstalt für
Finanzdienstleistungssaufsicht (BaFin), started operating based on the law on a
single financial services supervisory authority (Gesetz über die integrierte
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht).
Objectives, Responsibilities and Scope of Supervisory Powers
The overall objective of the BaFin is to ensure the stability and integrity of the
German financial system as a whole. The two resulting objectives are:
safeguarding the solvency of banks, financial services providers and insurance
companies; and protection of consumers and investors. Thus, the BaFin is a
single regulator in the sense that it combines both prudential and conduct of
business aspects.9
The BaFin’s responsibilities cover the supervision of the widest range of
financial institutions, including credit institutions, insurance companies, other
financial institutions and securities markets. It combines the responsibilities of
the hitherto existing sectoral supervisory agencies: The Bundesaufsichtsamt für
das Kreditwesen (BAKred) that was responsible – in co-operation with the
Bundesbank – for supervising banks; the Bundesaufsichtsamt für das
Versicherungswesen (BAV) that regulated insurance companies; and the
Bundesaufsichtsamt für den Wertpapierhandel (BAWe) that was in charge of
securities activities at the federal level. Exchange supervision remains, by
contrast, in the jurisdiction of the federal states.
Internal Organisation
BaFin is chaired by a President and a Deputy President with the support of three
Chief Executive Directors heading the three core directorates for supervision of
banking, insurance, and securities/asset management (see Figure 6 for an
organisation chart). These core directorates largely correspond to the three
former supervisory agencies – minus the collective tasks common to all three
areas that are now handled by cross-sectoral departments. The Banking
Supervision directorate has been assigned all regulatory powers as regards
                                          
8 The Länder could have blocked the bill with a 2/3-majority in the Bundesrat.
9 Another so called functional approach is to have separate agencies for prudential and
conduct of business supervision. For example, the Netherlands have adopted such an
approach.
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solvency-oriented supervision of credit institutions. The Insurance Supervision
directorate is responsible for insurance undertakings both in terms of solvency
and conformity with legislative requirements. The directorate Securities/Asset
Management is in charge of regulating the respective markets in accordance
with the Securities Trading Act (Wertpapierhandelsgesetz - WpHG) and the
Securities Acquisition and Takeover Act (Wertpapiererwerbs- und
Übernahmegesetz - WpÜG). This pillar organisation ensures that sector specific
peculiarities are taken into account, which is necessary since the underlying
regulation hasn’t changed.
Figure 6: Organisation of BaFin
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To maximise the synergies and to deal with issues affecting all directorates,
three cross-sectoral departments were created:
 The department International/Financial Markets deals with the supervision
of financial conglomerates, reporting and disclosure of banking and
insurance companies, as well as with fundamental supervisory issues related
to national and international financial markets. The department includes also
tasks with respect to the co-operation of the BaFin in international
supervisory committees, such as the Basel committee and the various
European committees.
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 The department Consumer and Investors Protection/Certification of Pension
Contracts deals with fundamental issues of consumer protection as well as
with specific consumer complaints concerning banks, financial institutions
and insurers. In addition, this department is in charge of the certification of
pension contracts and retirement schemes.
 The department Integrity of the Financial System deals with fundamental and
legal questions concerning the prosecution of illegal banking, financial
services and insurance practices.
The core directorates and the cross-sectoral departments, as well as the Central
Administration unit, responsible for personnel, organisation, information
technology and the budget, report to the Deputy President.
In addition there are four staff units directly reporting to the President: the
President’s Office; Press and Public Relations/Management of Internal
Information; the Internal Audit/Data Protection unit; and the Anti-Money
Laundering group.
BaFin is based in Bonn and Frankfurt, as the BAKred and the BAV were located
in Bonn and the BAWe in Frankfurt.10
By late 2002 there were 1,277 positions at BaFin: 468.5 positions fell into the
upper executive level, 464 were senior management roles, 284.5 were in middle
management, and 60 at the junior public service level.
Supervision of Financial Conglomerates
The internal organisation of the BaFin continues to preserve the distinction
between banking, insurance and securities supervision as separate operational
divisions within the integrated agency. Although there are three cross-sectoral
departments that deal with issues relating to all financial sectors, there exists no
separate division for the supervision of financial conglomerates. Only a
subdivision to the cross-sectoral department International/Financial Markets
deals explicitly with the supervision of financial conglomerates.
As mentioned above, this pillar organisation ensures that sector specific
differences are taken into account. Moreover, it has the virtue of simplicity.
However, it is not very suitable for improving communication when it comes to
supervising financial conglomerates (Taylor and Fleming, 1999a, b).
                                          
10 This straddle may be not optimal, since the majority of banks in Germany are
headquartered in Frankfurt (vision+money, 2002). The Bundesbank which is strongly
involved in banking supervision is, however, located in Frankfurt.
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Another impediment in this respect is the fact that the underlying regulation
hasn’t changed (BaFin, 2004, 2002). There was a new law passed on a single
financial services supervisory authority (Gesetz über die integrierte
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht) which builds the basis for BaFin. However,
BaFin is still working mostly with legislation inherited from its predecessor
organisations. With respect to banking supervision this is primarily the
Kreditwesengesetz (KWG); with respect to insurance supervision the
Versicherungsaufsichtsgesetz (VAG); and with respect to securities/asset
management the Wertpapierhandelsgesetz (WpHG). There exists no single,
coherent financial services statute under which conglomerates can be regulated.
Therefore, it could be difficult to deliver some of the alleged benefits of an
integrated approach to supervision of financial conglomerates.
According to Taylor and Fleming (1999a, b) this problem applies to most of the
recently established integrated supervisory authorities. An alternative would be
to organise the integrated agency along more “functional” lines, by, e.g.,
distinguishing between larger, systematically important institutions and smaller,
non-systemic institutions. However, this may result in a complex internal matrix
management structure.
Although financial conglomerates haven’t been of major importance for the
German financial market in the past, the merger of Allianz and Dresdner Bank
has – at least partly – changed this picture.11 Besides, the apparent integration of
financial sectors, e.g., with respect to products and distribution channels, makes
a truly integrated supervisory structure also important. Whether the newly
created cross-sectoral departments supplementing the pillar structure of the
BaFin are sufficient has to be seen in the future.
Another potential problem of preserving the distinction between banking,
insurance and securities supervision as separate operational divisions may be a
tendency to preserve also existing institutional cultures, thereby inhibiting the
authority’s ability to function as a single integrated entity (Taylor and Fleming,
1999a). Certainly, it is too early to say whether such a problem is present in the
case of the BaFin.
Governance
BaFin is subject to legal and supervisory control of the Ministry of Finance, but
it is a functionally and organisationally independent body (IMF, 2003).
Although the Ministry of Finance could in principle issue instructions on a range
                                          
11 As mentioned in Section 2, the decision in January 2001 to integrate supervision wasn’t
mainly justified by the need to respond to the formation of financial conglomerates.
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of organisational and other matters, in practice it does not interfere in
supervisory matters.
The management of BaFin is monitored by an Administrative Council. It
comprises 21 representatives coming from the Federal Ministry of Finance (4
including the chairman), the Federal Ministry of Economics and Labour (1), the
Federal Ministry of Justice (1), the Parliament (5), and the financial industry
(10), i.e. the companies BaFin supervises.
Moreover, an Advisory Board advises BaFin on how to carry out its specific
tasks. It is composed of 24 members from the banking and insurance industry,
consumer protection associations, academic institutes, and the German
Bundesbank.
Funding
Before the unification of supervision 10 percent of the budgets (in 1999 some
EUR 6.9 million) of the three supervisory agencies were funded by the federal
government (vision+money, 2002). The newly established single supervisor is
now completely financed by levies and fees paid by the supervised
organisations; thus, BaFin receives no funding from the federal budget (BaFin,
2003).12 In addition to contributions by the regulated companies, BaFin charges
fees for certain services. In 2003 (2004) total budget for income and expenses
was set at EUR 118.8 (132.5) million. The 2003 (2004) income was generated
from advanced payments of allocation of costs of EUR 106.8 (120.7) million
and service fees of EUR 11.9 (11.7) million.
5 The Involvement of the Bundesbank
The decision to create an integrated supervisory agency also raises the issue of
the involvement of the central bank. In this respect Germany may be regarded as
a special case among the countries that have adopted a single supervisory
agency, since the Bundesbank plays a significant role in banking supervision
(Sanio, 2003).13
The pros and cons of the involvement of the central bank in banking supervision
are well-known.14 In the German context it was argued that the often cited
                                          
12 The Bundesbank pays for its own banking supervisory effort.
13 With respect to the relationship between central banking and integrated financial
supervision, Masciandaro (2004) finds that most countries with a high level of unification
of supervisory powers exhibit weak central bank involvement in supervision.
14 See, e.g., Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1993, 1995), Haubrich (1996), ECB (2001).
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argument against central bank involvement, namely a potential conflict of
interest between supervision and monetary policy, has lost validity as the
national central banks are no longer in charge of monetary policy.
After having lost its monetary policy powers the Bundesbank would have liked
to integrate the banking supervisory agency BAKred and become Germany’s
single bank supervisor. The pleading of prominent central bankers was
supported by some academics (Kösters et al., 2001) stating that economies of
scope resulting form the joint execution of monetary and supervisory tasks can
only be realised with a central bank solution. With the establishment of the
BaFin the plans of central bankers to integrate the supervisory authority into the
Bundesbank were shattered.
The Bundesbank remains, however, highly involved in the supervision of
banks.15 The co-operation between BaFin and Bundesbank is regulated by
Artikel 7 of the Banking Act (Kreditwesengesetz - KWG); details are outlined in
a Memorandum of Understanding.
The BaFin remains, as was the BAKred, the only decision making authority with
respect to the supervision of credit institutions, investment firms and other
financial institutions regulated by the banking act (Sanio, 2003). The
involvement of the Bundesbank in the prudential supervision applies in practice
mostly to the day-to-day supervision of banks. In this respect there is close co-
operation between the BaFin and the regional representations of the
Bundesbank. This “ongoing supervision” of banks and financial institutions
comprises off-site activities, such as the analysis of submitted documents,
annual reports and auditor’s reports, as well as on-site examinations to assess,
e.g., the capital adequacy and the risk management measures of the institutions.
Moreover, to the extent legally possible, BaFin is now enabled to base its
supervisory decisions on the assessments and findings by the Bundesbank.
Overall, the new arrangements are expected to avoid double work and increase
the effectiveness of day-to-day banking supervision (Sanio, 2003).
The Forum for Financial Market Supervision (Forum für Finanzmarktaufsicht)
co-ordinates collaborative work conducted by BaFin and the Bundesbank. It is
set up within BaFin and jointly run by BaFin and the Bundesbank. Thereby
meetings between high-ranking representatives from both institutions are
formalised. It also provides advice on supervisory issues that are significant to
the stability of the financial system. This includes also issues with regard to
integrated supervision. By establishing this forum, the BaFin and the
                                          
15 Some say that the Bundesbank ended up having even greater powers in banking supervision
than before (Börsen-Zeitung, 2002; vision+money, 2002).
19
Bundesbank are acknowledged as the authorities jointly responsible for the
stability of the financial system.
6 Conclusion
With the establishment of the Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht
(BaFin) in May 2002, Germany followed the trend towards integrated financial
supervision. Among the countries having adopted a single supervisory authority
Germany may be regarded as special since the Bundesbank remains strongly
involved in banking supervision.
The main argument in favour of unification of supervisory functions is that
financial sectors become more and more integrated, thus, blurring the
boundaries between banking, insurance and securities activities. Although, in
Germany financial conglomerates have been only of minor importance, the
acquisition of Dresdner Bank by Allianz has created a significant Allfinanz
group. Moreover, developments such as the reform of pension systems
increasingly induce that products are being offered that combine banking and
insurance products.
The creation of BaFin merged the hitherto separated supervisory agencies for
banking, insurance and securities, which is reflected in the pillar organisation of
the new single authority. Three cross-sectoral departments deal with issues
relating to all financial sectors. Whether this organisational structure inhibits
BaFin’s ability to function as a single integrated entity and deliver the benefits
of an integrated supervisory approach has to be seen in the future.
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